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Abstract
Background: This study examines the effects of a shift in medical coverage, from National Health Insurance (NHI)
to Medical Aid (MA), on health care utilization (measured by the number of outpatient visits and length of stay;
LOS) and out-of-pocket medical expenses.
Methods: Data were collected from the Korean Welfare Panel Study (2010–2016). A total of 888 MA Type I
beneficiaries and 221 MA Type II beneficiaries who shifted from the NHI were included as the case group and 2664
and 663 consecutive NHI holders (1:3 propensity score-matched) were included as the control group, respectively.
We used the ‘difference-in-differences’ (DiD) analysis approach to assess changes in health care utilization and
medical spending by the group members.
Results: Differential average changes in outpatient visits in the MA Type I panel between the pre- and post-shift
periods were significant, but differential changes in LOS were not found. Those who shifted from NHI to MA Type I
had increased number of outpatient visits without changes in out-of-pocket spending, compared to consecutive
NHI holder who had similar characteristics. However, this was not found for MA Type II beneficiaries.
Conclusion: Our research provides evidence that the shift in medical coverage from NHI to MA Type I increased
the number of outpatient visits without increasing the out-of-pocket spending. Considering the problem of excess
medical utilization by Korean MA Type I beneficiaries, further researches are required to have in-depth discussions
on the appropriateness of the current cost-sharing level on MA beneficiaries.
Keywords: South Korea, Medical aid, National Health Insurance, Health care utilization, Out-of-pocket medical
spending, Difference-in-differences, Propensity score
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Background
South Korea has often been acclaimed for providing uni-
versal medical coverage for its entire population in only
12 years [1]. The Korean National Health Insurance
(NHI) system began by providing cover for industrial
workers in large corporations in 1977. It was gradually
extended to other groups like self-employed workers
until the scheme covered the entire population by 1989.
Along with the NHI, a Medical Aid (MA) program was
simultaneously initiated in 1977 as part of a South Ko-
rean social welfare program, called the National Basic
Livelihood Security System, which supports poor people
in need of medical assistance. It is comparable to the
USA’s Medicaid program.
Approximately 3 to 4% of the entire population are en-
titled to MA, and they are segregated into Type I and
Type II recipients based on their economic inability or
incapacitation (2.8% in 2017) [2]. Type I covers those
who are socially deprived and or incapable of working
(those aged under 18 or over 65; disabled people; those
with severe and rare diseases, and other special cases) [3,
4]. Type II also covers those who are socially deprived
but are capable of working [3, 4]. Type I beneficiaries
are not required to provide copayments for any medical
utilization, whereas Type II beneficiaries have minimum
copayment rates of up to 15% [3, 4].
Over time, the MA program has undergone many
modifications regarding its beneficiary inclusion criteria
and coverage expansion plan, along with the challenges
of its sustainability. In 2006, the Korean government an-
nounced the need for a major amendment to the MA
law owing to the challenges faced in continuing the MA
program. These challenges arose from the increase in
the number of beneficiaries and the expansion of ser-
vices; the increased incidence of chronic diseases and an
aging population resulted in the continuous rise in reim-
bursements for MA beneficiaries [3]. Furthermore, about
10% of the beneficiaries used health care services exces-
sively and accounted for about 60% of the total MA ex-
penditure [3, 5]. Additionally, the moral hazards of MA
utilization by MA beneficiaries were publicized continu-
ously, because as health care spending increased with in-
surance, the real value of health care declined compared
to the costs incurred in providing it [5].
Accordingly, in 2007, the Korean government imple-
mented several cost-sharing directives. First, the
government mandated out-of-pocket spending on out-
patient services for Type I beneficiaries [6]. Besides,
since 2018, Type I beneficiaries have had to pay ₩1000,
₩2000, and ₩3000 ($1 = around ₩1120) for each out-
patient visit to a clinic, secondary hospital, and tertiary
hospital, respectively, while there is no cost for inpatient
services availed [7]. Furthermore, Type II beneficiaries
must pay 1000 per outpatient clinic visit and 15% extra
for a single secondary or tertiary hospital outpatient visit;
and there is an out-of-pocket expense of 10% of the total
expenditure for inpatient services availed [7].
In addition to mandating out-of-pocket spending by
beneficiaries, the government levied a monthly health
management fee to moderate possible abuse of med-
ical facilities provided under the Healthy Life Main-
tenance Aid Program [7, 8]. Through this program,
each Type I beneficiary receives, ₩6000 (around $6)
monthly, via a virtual account [7, 8]. Upon receipt of
outpatient medical services, beneficiaries make a
copayment via the virtual account [7, 8]. If the benefi-
ciaries spend the entire amount available in the vir-
tual account, they must bear the additional costs
themselves [7, 8]. Money remaining in the virtual ac-
count cannot be converted to cash [7, 8].
Despite these changes, the total medical expenditure
by MA beneficiaries has steadily increased, and the
medical costs per person are three times higher than
for NHI covered individuals [8–13]. Furthermore, sev-
eral recent studies have revealed that MA beneficiar-
ies use outpatient services more frequently and stay
longer in hospital compared with NHI-covered indi-
viduals [8, 10–13]. Studies have also revealed the dif-
ferences between the health care utilization of MA
and NHI beneficiaries. It has been observed that MA
Type I and Type II beneficiaries share some socioeco-
nomic status (SES) characteristics, such as age, in-
come, health status, and economic activity status [9].
Few studies have compared health care utilization be-
tween MA beneficiaries and NHI-covered individuals
with similar SES [12, 13]. However, these studies have
neither compared groups with changing health care
utilization, nor medical spending, and they have not
considered the shift from NHI to MA. Our study is
the first in South Korea to compare the health care
utilization and out-of-pocket spending of individuals
who have NHI coverage and those who have shifted
from NHI to MA and have similar SES.
Therefore, in our study, we identified a case group
that has experienced a shift in coverage from NHI to
MA because we mainly hypothesized that becoming
MA beneficiaries could lead higher use of health care
utilization and spending, compared with a matched
control group that has had consecutive NHI coverage
and exhibits SES characteristics similar to the case
group. Subsequently, we were able to estimate differ-
ential changes in the groups’ health care utilization
and out-of-pocket medical spending in the pre-and
post-shift periods using a difference-in-differences
(DiD) analysis method. We also hypothesized that the
shift in coverage would increase both the number of
outpatient visits and length of stay (LOS) and de-
crease out-of-pocket medical spending.
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Methods
Data source
We analyzed data from the Korean Welfare Panel Study
(KoWePS), 2010–2016 conducted by the Korean Insti-
tute for Health and Social Affairs. The KoWePS data are
nationally representative as stratified multistage prob-
ability sampling to select households from rural and
urban areas was employed. All family members of both
parents and children in the selected households were
interviewed. Face-to-face interviews were conducted an-
nually from January to February, using a computer-
assisted personal interviewing technique. The KoWePS
database includes detailed information about the respon-
dents and their household members, including general
characteristics, social security status, health care utilization
patterns, economic and demographic backgrounds, sub-
jective health status, and behavioral health status.
Difference-in-differences study design
When examining the impact of an intervention or
change in policy, the challenge is in determining
whether the observed changes are attributable to the
intervention. A valid method of assessing this is to
compare outcomes for the group that is subject to
the intervention (the case group) with a group that is
not (the control group). As a randomized study de-
sign is rarely feasible in the field of health policy, a
quasi-experimental study design to measure the effect
of health care interventions is frequently applied.
We employed an observational study along with a DiD
analysis, which is a widely used quasi-experimental study
design, to compare health care utilization and out-of-
pocket medical spending between the case group and its
matched control group. To do so, we began by matching
characteristics between the groups and controlled for
background trends by performing a propensity score
(PS) match.
The DiD approach necessitates some assumptions to
evaluate the intervention effect accurately. First, as the
DiD estimator measures the treatment effect by examin-
ing the difference in the average outcome between the
control and case groups, before and after treatment [14],
at least two periods of data must be available for each
group. Second, the DiD approach is valid only if there
are no underlying time-dependent trends in the out-
comes that are unrelated to the change of coverage [14].
If the outcomes were already improving before the shift,
then a pre−/post-study would erroneously conclude that
the policy was associated with better outcomes [14]. The
DiD study addresses this problem by using a comparison
group that is experiencing the same trends but which is
not exposed to the policy change; this is also known as
the parallel trend assumption [15, 16]. Third, the control
group should be the same as the intervention group in
everything other than the change in policy [14, 17, 18].
In practice, however, observed and unobserved differ-
ences exist between the two groups. To minimize the
differences, we applied the PS matching technique. We
assumed that in the absence of the policy intervention,
the unobserved differences between the two groups
would converge over time [17, 18].
Propensity score matching and covariate selection
PS matching aims to find one or more individuals with a
similar PS from the treatment and control groups. Vari-
ous methods are employed to match individuals, but we
used a 1:3 nearest-neighbor matching method which
matches case and control individuals who have a similar
propensity score value [19]. We added constraint that
the difference between the PS (caliper width) should be
0.1 at most, to avoid pairing dissimilar individuals. We
also considered methodological theories for selecting the
covariates in the PS model. First, using prior knowledge
to identify the covariates that affect the outcome and in-
cluding them in the PS model is better for estimating
the intervention effect [20]. Second, selecting covariates
that are strongly associated with exposure but unrelated
to the outcome should be avoided, because this may in-
crease the bias. Selecting variables for the PSs, based on
their association with the outcome may help to reduce
such a bias [21]. Therefore, to estimate the medical
coverage shift effect, we matched the control group to
the case group by including the following parameters or
questions in the PS model: gender; residential area (in
the capital or elsewhere); marital status (yes or no);
economic activity (yes or no); age (< 20, < 40, < 65, or ≥
65 years); equivalized household disposable income
(quintile groups; Q1–Q5); subjective health status (good,
moderate, or bad); the number of private insurance
schemes; expenditure on private insurance; and survey
year (2010–2016).
Intervention
The shift from NHI to MA Type I or II was represented
by the intervention variable. Based on the intervention
time, we classified the pre- and post-intervention pe-
riods. Then, we classified the available data for the case
group into models according to the following periods:
from 1 year before and after (Model 1); 2 years before
and after (Model 2); and 3 years before and after (Model
3) (Figure S1). A potential critical issue is that the inter-
vention time may differ among the individuals in the
case group. However, since we matched the survey years
along with the SES variables between the case and con-
trol groups, we could match the individuals precisely in
the case and control groups for each year.
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Study population
We initially included 132,136 individuals from the
KoWePS dataset of 2010–2016. After excluding those
with missing values, 99,140 remained. We separated
these into the MA Type I panel, which included 888
MA Type I beneficiaries and 2664 matched controls;
and the MA Type II panel, which contained 221 MA
Type II beneficiaries and 663 matched controls (Fig. 1).
Outcomes
We examined changes in the individuals’ average health
care utilization and out-of-pocket medical spending in
the previous year. The first outcome was the differential
changes between the groups in the average number of
outpatient visits annually per person in the pre- and
post-intervention periods. The second outcome was the
differential changes in the LOS, and the third was the
differential change in the average out-of-pocket medical
spending.
Statistical analysis
We used the generalized estimating equation (GEE) and
DiD approach to estimate the changes in health care
utilization and out-of-pocket spending from the pre- to
the post-intervention periods that differed from concur-
rent changes in the case group and its matched control
group. The GEE model accounts for time variations and
correlations among repeated measurements that are
present in longitudinal study designs and is appropriate
for marginal estimates with non-linear link functions
[22]. We applied the log-link with zero-inflated negative
binomial distribution to the outcome variables because
of the high incidence of zero counts in outpatient visits,
LOS, and out-of-pocket medical spending [23]. Then,
Fig. 1 Flowchart of the study design. Abbreviation: Korean Welfare Panel Study: KoWePS; Equivalized Household Disposable Income: EHDI;
Propensity Score: PS; Medical Aid: MA
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specifically, for each dependent variable, we fit the fol-
lowing model:
log E Yitð Þð Þ ¼ β0 þ β1 case indicatori
þ β2 post indicatort
þ β3 case indicatori  post indicatortð Þ
þ β4 covariatesit ;
where Log(E) denotes the exponentiated expected value;
Yit is the initial outcome with a specified distribution op-
tion (health care utilization and out-of-pocket spending)
for individual i at time t from intervention; case_indica-
tor is a vector of the groups (case or control group);
post_indicator is a vector of the pre−/post-indicators
(whether individual i entered the post-intervention or
not); covariates denote a vector of the other individual’s
characteristics (the most-visited type of medical institu-
tion and last period of affliction by chronic disease). All
the statistical tests were two-tailed, and a p-value < 0.05
was considered significant; analyses were performed
using the Statistical Analysis System version 9.4 (Cary,
North Carolina, USA).
Results
Characteristics of the study population
Eight hundred eighty-eight beneficiaries underwent a
shift in medical coverage from NHI to MA Type I, and
221 beneficiaries experienced a shift in medical coverage
from NHI to MA Type II. By considering their SES char-
acteristics and the survey year, the matched control
groups were selected through a 1:3 PS matching process
(details of the PS matching process are included in the
Methods section and shown in Fig. 1). The bivariate re-
sult showed that there were no significant differences in
any year, among the individuals in the case and control
groups (Table 1).
Pre-intervention trends
The trends in unadjusted health care utilization and out-
of-pocket medical spending of the MA beneficiaries and
NHI holders throughout the study period are shown in
Fig. 2. In the MA Type I and II panels, the trends in the
average number of outpatient visits and LOS among the
case and control groups before the intervention were
parallel, but out-of-pocket medical spending was not.
Given the significant difference in trends between the
two groups and the possibility of a bias in the analysis
[14], it was deemed appropriate to address the estimates
of the number of outpatient visits and LOS in both
panels, but not the estimates of out-of-pocket medical
spending.
Health care utilization [outpatient visit, length of stay]
In the MA Type I panel, in Model 1, the average number
of outpatient visits increased from 25.7 times per year to
34.6 times per year in the case group, and it was almost
the same in the control group. The adjusted differential
change between the case and control groups for Model
1 is 31.8%, p < 0.021. The results remained statistically
significant in Model 2 and Model 3 at 22.3%, p < 0.032
and 18.8%, p < 0.044, respectively (Table 2, Table S1).
However, differential changes in LOS were not found in
any of the periods. Regarding the MA Type II panel,
there were no significant differential changes in any
health care utilization (Table 2, Table S2).
Out-of-pocket medical spending
In both the MA Type I and II panels, there were no sig-
nificant changes in out-of-pocket medical spending.
Even though the differential change in out-of-pocket
medical spending in Model 3 was statistically significant
(adjusted differential change between the case and con-
trol group: − 23.2%, p < 0.009), it is not appropriate to
interpret it as meaningful because a parallel trend was
not found in the pre-intervention period.
Discussion
Using the DiD approach, we estimated the effect a shift
in medical coverage has on health care utilization and
medical spending. We compared a case group with a
control group with similar SES and subjective health sta-
tus parameters. We found that a shift in medical cover-
age from NHI to MA Type I increased outpatient visits
but did not affect LOS. Furthermore, we did not find dif-
ferential changes in out-of-pocket spending between the
case and control groups in the MA Type I panel. Thus,
we can state there was an increase in outpatient visits
but no changes in out-of-pocket spending.
Our results deviate from the findings of previous stud-
ies as we did not compare MA beneficiaries with the
general population but instead with a population subset
with similar characteristics. We estimated the differential
changes in the outcomes between the pre-shift period
and post-shift period; accordingly, different results were
found.
Unlike the findings from previous studies that MA
beneficiaries remain in hospital longer than the general
population [24, 25], we found that the shift to MA did
not increase LOS significantly when compared to groups
with similar characteristics. Furthermore, by examining
MA Type I and II, we identified that the shift to MA
Type I could induce frequent outpatient visits, but the
shift to Type II did not. The reasons for these results are
as follows: (1) Type II beneficiaries are subject to higher
amounts of out-of-pocket spending on health care be-
cause Type I are subject to little or no copayment, and
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Type II are subject to 10–15% copayment of the medical
costs. (2) MA Type II beneficiaries are more likely to be
healthier than Type I beneficiaries since most of them
are younger and able to work.
Approximately 10% of the total population of South
Korea is 120% below the poverty line; of these, only
about 3% are MA beneficiaries, and the rest are un-
acknowledged by the health care system receiving little
medical cost assistance from the government [26–28].
This is a challenging issue as this part of the population
remains exposed to health risks due to poor access to
health care services [26], and is a moral hazard for MA
Table 1 Study Population Characteristics Among National Health Insurance Holders and Those Who Shifted From National Health
Insurance to Medical Aid Who Were Matched Using the Propensity Score Before and After the Shift For All Years
Medical Aid Type I Panel Medical Aid Type II Panel
NHI→Medical
Aid Type I














No. of subjects 888 17,629 2664 221 17,629 663
Subjects’ characteristics
Sex, women, % 61.0 53.9 60.8 .94 62.5 53.9 60.3 .57
Residential area, in capital, % 32.0 37.6 31.5 .79 25.9 37.6 24.5 .68
Married, % 46.2 60.1 47.1 .64 32.4 60.1 36.1 .32
Economic activity, % 25.0 48.9 24.6 .81 40.7 48.9 40.9 .97
Age, %
< 20 2.4 4.4 2.1 .94 9.3 4.4 8.2 .53
< 40 7.4 37.1 7.5 13.0 37.1 17.1
< 65 19.3 36.9 18.9 41.2 36.9 39.2
65 ≤ 70.9 31.7 71.5 36.6 31.7 35.5
Equivalized disposable household incomeb, %
Quintile 1 (0–20%) 73.2 18.4 73.6 .78 65.3 18.4 67.9 .50
Quintile 2 (21–40%) 16.7 15.6 16.0 30.1 15.6 25.3
Quintile 3 (41–60%) 6.0 15.5 5.6 3.2 15.5 4.9
Quintile 4 (61–80%) 2.3 20.3 3.1 0.9 20.3 1.5
Quintile 5 (81–100%) 1.8 30.2 1.7 0.5 30.2 0.3
Subjective health status, %
Good 30.9 60.0 30.5 .96 54.6 60.0 56.0 .94
Moderate 23.9 17.9 23.8 19.9 17.9 19.4
Bad 45.2 22.1 45.7 25.5 22.1 24.5
No. of private insurances,
mean (SD)
0.1 (0.5) 0.8 (1.8) 0.1 (0.5) .23 0.3 (0.6) 0.8 (1.8) 0.3 (0.7) .29
Expenditure on private
insurance, $/year, mean (SD)c
253.3 (1065.0) 1520.1 (2234.1) 208.2 (844.0) .25 429.5 (867.7) 1520.1 (2234.1) 490.3 (1042.8) .40
Year, %
2010 12.8 12.2 12.6 1.00 13.9 12.2 15.0 .96
2011 12.7 12.5 12.8 16.2 12.5 18.5
2012 17.7 15.8 17.5 21.3 15.8 19.9
2013 15.2 15.6 15.6 19.0 15.6 17.3
2014 15.8 15.1 15.7 15.7 15.1 15.7
2015 13.7 14.8 13.6 9.7 14.8 8.6
2016 12.1 14.1 12.2 4.2 14.1 4.9
Abbreviation: NHI National Health Insurance, SD Standard Deviation
*Table 1 represents the characteristics of the subjects in the Medical Aid Type I panel and Medical Aid Type II panel
aP-values reflect t-tests for continuous variables (number of private insurances and expenditure on private insurance) and x2 tests for dichotomous/categorical
variables (age, sex, equivalent disposable household income, marital status, economic activity status, and subjective health status
bAll of the subjects’ equivalent household income levels were allocated into each quantile for each year based on the data from the Korean government’s
statistics report
cCalculated in dollars ($) from won (₩) at the exchange rate announced every December in the Korean statistics
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beneficiaries (especially Type I) [13, 24]. This indicates
that limited government finances are not being spent
efficiently.
Previously, the government has implemented policies
and programs to address these issues, including mandat-
ing the outpatient copayment system for Type I benefi-
ciaries, introducing a monthly health management fee to
regulate possible abuse of medical utilization, and a case
management program [9]. However, they have not been
very successful [9–11, 29–31]. The reasons are as fol-
lows: (1) weak government control over medical access
by beneficiaries [9, 11, 29], (2) little or no copayment fee
[8–13, 25, 30], and (3) selection criteria for MA benefi-
ciaries that focuses more on family characteristics than
individual characteristics [29].
A major reason for the continuous, excessive use of
medical services is that the minimum level of cost-
sharing is too low [8–13, 25, 30]. Increasing the mini-
mum level or converting the copayment system to coin-
surance or deductible payments in the MA Type I could
be considered. Although the suggestion may be contro-
versial because it would impose an additional burden on
some beneficiaries, we support it for the following rea-
sons. First, adequate copayment or coinsurance payment
is associated with a decrease in unnecessary medical
utilization; a similar step was implemented in the USA’s
healthcare system. In the USA, public insurance for the
lowest income population with little copayment or coin-
surance has been a concern since it burdens the fiscal
with excessive use of medical services along with moral
Fig. 2 Trends in unadjusted health care utilization and out-of-pocket medical spending among NHI holders and those who shifted from NHI to
MA for the Medical Aid Type I panel (A1, 2, and 3) and MA Type II panel (B1, 2, and 3)
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hazards. An empirical example is Massachusetts’ Com-
monwealth Care program, which imposed higher copay-
ments to low-income enrollees to reduce the fiscal
pressures associated with insurance expansion by the
scope for moral hazard [32]. However, there remained
speculation that low-income populations may be more
likely to have adverse health consequences from the re-
sult of higher cost-sharing as they could not afford the
increased burden, which is also called “offset effects” [32,
33]. However, the evidence proved that no notable offset
effect was found with the increase of copayment in the
low-income population [33]. Accordingly, imposing
copayment for the use of the emergency department
[34], or pharmaceutical services in a Medicaid program
[35, 36] reportedly improved overall health status. Sec-
ond, the degree of cost-sharing has changed little since
it was introduced in 2007. Third, excessive government
expenditure on MA reduces the availability of funds for
allocation to other governmental medical support
schemes. A statistical report from the Korean govern-
ment has indicated that MA payments account for
12.0% of the total NHI expenditure, and the total med-
ical expenses related to MA increased dramatically by
39.2% (from 5.1 trillion Won in 2011 to 7.1 trillion
Won in 2017). This was despite a decrease in the num-
ber of MA beneficiaries from 1.61 million people to
1.49 million people (− 7.65%) during the same period
[37]. Furthermore, compared to NHI holders, the MA
beneficiaries’ medical expenses per capita is 3.6 times
higher, and the LOS per capita is four times higher
[37]. Considering that MA beneficiaries are a vulner-
able population, 22.9% of the entire population of MA
beneficiaries used health care for more than 365 days
(the total number of days for outpatient visits, LOS,
and medication dosage) [37]. This suggests that ad-
equate control of medical utilization by MA beneficiar-
ies is still lacking. Additionally, our study implies that
being an MA beneficiary significantly increases the
number of outpatient visits without any significant
changes to out-of-pocket spending on medical use.
From previous studies, we can infer that the reason
newcomers to MA frequently use outpatient services is
that the out-of-pocket spending level is extremely low
[8–13, 25, 30]. Therefore, a modification of the MA
cost-sharing level should be discussed thoroughly with
evidence-based future researches.
As our study has several limitations, the results should
be interpreted and generalized with caution. First, owing
to data limitation, we could not incorporate several other
factors that may affect health care utilization. In the DiD
approach, however, if the parallel trend assumption is met
between the case and control groups, it can remove the
effect of any confounding factors [14–16]. Therefore, the
estimates of the number of outpatient visits and LOS in
the MA Type I and Type II panels could be free from con-
founding issues to some extent. Second, we were not able
to consider the number of emergency visits separately
since there was no such information in the KoWePS data.
Third, the KoWePS data obtained information about
health care utilization through self-reporting, and the sur-
veyors collected data retrospectively based on receipts.
Therefore, these two factors may have distorted the results
of medical utilization.
Conclusions
Regarding the ongoing problem of excess medical
utilization by MA Type I beneficiaries in Korea, restraint
should be in place. Therefore, our research provides evi-
dence that the shift in medical coverage from NHI to MA
Type I increased the number of outpatient visits without
increasing the out-of-pocket spending. However, neither
of increased outpatient visit and out-of-pocket spending
was found for shifting from NHI to MA Type II. Further
research requires in-depth discussions on the appropriate-
ness of the current cost-sharing level on MA beneficiaries.
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penditure on private insurance.
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